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Abstract
Based on a new panel dataset created in close cooperation with one of the largest temporary
help agencies (THAs) in Germany, this paper presents novel evidence on key aspects of tempo-
rary agency work, a segment of the labor market that despite its growing importance remains
underresearched. In particular, we provide detailed information on the internal operation of a
THA and the allocative function it performs both as an intermediate demander and as a …nal
supplier of labor in this submarket. In addition to o¤ering …rst examination of e¤ective wage
and fee schedules, we document, among others, the rise of on-call hiring, recalls and …xed-term
contracts in the recruitment of workers, the reasons for job termination, as well as the volume
of labor actually contracted per worker and per worker-client match. We show that the THA
manages to utilize e¤ectively its workforce in assignments and keeps idle labor at a minimum.
In fact, more than a third of workers exhibit multiple client engagements. One-o¤ recruitment
and dismissal costs per worker can thus e¤ectively be spread across di¤erent clients.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Temporary agency work is characterized by a triangular relationship between agencies, workers, and
client …rms that is at odds with the bipolar structure of supply and demand generally encountered
on the labor market. For a temporary help agency (THA) ”hires a worker for the purpose of
placing him or her at the disposal of a third party, the user enterprise, for a temporary assignment”
(Bronstein, 1991). These middlemen or matchmakers therefore act as labor market intermediaries
between …nal labor supply and demand. Geared towards satisfying short-term labor demand, the
THA industry a¤ords clients spot-market type, fast access to labor services, the use of which can
be terminated both swiftly and at no cost to the client. By making use of agency services, client
…rms in fact outsource their employer and recruiting function to the THA. As a highly ‡exible,
freely disposable personnel reserve, agency workers or temps constitute a mere variable cost-factor
to the …nal demanders of labor. From the perspective of client …rms, therefore, labor contracted
through a THA ceases to be a quasi-…xed factor of production (Oi, 1962).
The industry has experienced rapid growth over the last three decades in Germany, a trend
that is observable in most industrialized countries (Storrie, 2002). In light of persistent high
levels of unemployment, disappointing employment growth, and a labor market that is seen as
overly rigid, temporary agency work has increasingly caught the attention of policy makers in
Germany. In its large-scale labor market reform package passed in Parliament in late 2002, the
German government has even put temporary agency work centerpiece in its catalogue of measures
to combat unemployment. However, little is in fact known about the operation of this submarket,
as the THA - the central actor involved - pretty much remains a "black box" (Garhammer, 2001).
This de…ciency can be attributed to the lack of adequate data. For existing data sets, such as the
CPS for the US or the IAB Employment Sample for Germany that have been used for empirical
analyses of the THA submarket, do not contain any information on the actual temping activity
carried out by THAs, being con…ned by design in their coverage to the immediate employment
relationship between agency and worker only.
In close cooperation with one of the largest THAs in Germany, we have created a new data
set drawing from information collected at its payroll and accounting o¢ce that is suitable for
addressing a wide range of questions concerning the THA industry and its operation hitherto
unexplored. The primary objective of this paper and its contribution to the still scattered, but
growing literature on temporary agency work is to provide novel empirical evidence on (1) the
sta¢ng decisions and workforce management of THAs, and (2) their pricing policies with respect
to the ultimate suppliers (workers) and demanders of labor (client …rms), i.e. their operative wage
and fee schedules.
2In contrast to assumptions postulated in the existing literature (Neugart and Storrie, 2002), we
…nd THA hirings to occur primarily on-call as a reaction to current client demand to avoid the risk
of initial prolonged unproductive employment of workers, a recruitment strategy that necessitates
the screening of job-seekers well ahead of actual recruitment to be viable. Recalls, in turn, are
shown to be but infrequently employed by the THA as a means to economize on its screening
costs, for their use continues to be severely restricted by a statutory three-month recall ban.
Fixed-term contracts, on the other hand, have experienced rapid growth since their one-time use
became admissible in 1997, providing for additional ‡exibility in the termination of employment.
So do cancellation agreements in almost one out of six severances. Consistent with conjectures,
the markup of fees over wages is shown to be lower both for recalls and workers employed on a
…xed-term contract. Overall, and contrary to general perception, we …nd voluntary severances to
predominate in the termination of THA jobs. The agency, in fact, proves itself to be very e¢cient
in utilizing its existent workforce. Only a small fraction of total days lost is attributable to a lack of
client demand, both in the course of employment and in the immediate forefront of job termination.
In addition, more than a third of workers work in multiple client engagements that in sum account
for the majority of worker-client matches formed. Recruitment and dismissal costs per worker can
thus e¤ectively be spread across di¤erent clients. In about two-thirds of all worker-client matches,
in fact, the agency serves client demand by taking recourse to its existing workforce rather than
resorting to on-call recruitment. Actual weekly hours worked (at a client) are shown to on average
even exceed those agreed to contractually. The latter, we argue, may in fact deliberately be set
below levels than are likely to materialize, as a shortfall of actual hours from those agreed to is
more costly to the THA than an exceedance. The THA’s ability to adapt and time its own demand
for workers to the demand of client …rms for its services may also be improved by establishing close
customers ties. Consistent with this conjecture, we …nd client demand to be very concentrated
at the branch level. As wages stipulated in the employment contract are henceforth binding, the
THA may but downwardly adjust its client fees to further demand for its services and thereby
avoid unproductive employment of workers post their initial client assignment. We …nd client fees
to be indeed on average lower in the second than in the …rst client assignment of workers.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief summary of the legal rules
on temporary agency work in Germany and Section 3 introduces the dataset. Sections 4 and 5
contain the body of the empirical analysis. The …rst of the two examines the allocative role of
THAs as intermediate demanders and …nal suppliers of labor, i.e. their workforce management on
the extensive (hirings and …rings) and intensive (e¤ective utilization of existing workforce) margin.
The second documents the remuneration of THA workers and the fees charged to client …rms
3during periods of assignment of workers. Section 6 summarizes the main …ndings and concludes.
2 The Legal Framework
Since 1972 temporary agency work in Germany has been regulated comprehensively by law. Agen-
cies have to be licensed by the respective state-level public employment o¢ce, to which they are
obliged to provide statistical information on a regular basis. The biannual temporary agency work
statistics (ANUSTAT) of the federal employment o¢ce, the basic source of information on the
industry, is derived from these noti…cations. The employment contract between the agency and
the worker is generally open-ended and must contain detailed information on major aspects of the
employment relationship formed, such as pay levels, weekly hours of work, annual vacation days
and the like. However, since 1997, the one-time use of …xed-term contracts is allowed. Moreover,
a ban exists on the repeated synchronization of assignment and employment spells. Just as in
the case of …xed-term contracts, therefore, a synchronization is permitted but once for a partic-
ular worker. Otherwise a three-month recall ban must be observed. These peculiarities of the
German legislation on temporary agency work have long been a major source of discontent for
…rms operating on this submarket. However, unlike the legal situation in many other European
countries, THAs in Germany are not legally obliged to o¤er equal pay or equal treatment to their
workers during assignments based on working conditions enjoyed by the regular workforce of the
respective client …rm. Since 2002, however, workers assigned continuously with the same client
for more than twelve months must by law be paid the going wage rate of the client …rm. The
maximum permissible duration of a single assignment is 24 months. In addition, except for a
handful of …rm-level collective agreements, wages in the THA industry in Germany are in general
not collectively bargained. Client fees, too, are determined individually by the two parties to the
commercial assignment contract, i.e. the agency and the client …rm.
With the latest reform of the law on temporary agency work (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz)
introduced in late 2002, major legal changes are to take e¤ect in 2004. Henceforth, the maximum
assignment duration, the synchronization ban, the 3-month recall ban, and the industry-speci…c
restrictions on the use of …xed-term contracts will be fully repealed. In addition, placements in
the construction sector will be permitted. At the same time, however, agencies will be obliged by
law to provide equal pay and treatment to their workers during assignments in line with working
conditions enjoyed by comparable workers in the user enterprise. Deviations from equal pay and
equal treatment are only permitted for a period of six weeks for workers previously unemployed,
or if the agency is party to a collective agreement, in which case bargained wage schedules take
precedence. Collective bargaining rounds began in early 2003. After agreeing on cornerstones
4for several national cross-sector collective agreements setting pay and conditions for temporary
agency workers in February 2003, the Federal Association of Temporary Employment Agencies
(BZA) and representatives of all trade unions a¢liated to the German Federation of Trade unions
(DGB), signed at the end of May a framework collective agreement on pay grades and a collective
agreement on remuneration that take e¤ect in 2004 and are valid until the end of 2007. In June this
process was completed with an industry-wide collective agreement, e¤ectively banning the threat
of legislated equal pay and equal treatment clauses to ever take e¤ect.1
3T h e D a t a
The dataset (henceforth referred to as temporary help agency dataset, or THAD) has been de-
veloped in close cooperation with one of the largest temporary work agencies in Germany. For
the main part, it draws on data of the a¢liated branches collected at the payroll (Part I of data
set) and accounting o¢ce (Part II of data set) of the company’s headquarters. Part I roughly
corresponds to the agency-worker (employment) relationship, whereas Part II contains informa-
tion on the agency-client (commercial) relationship, although some overlap exists between the two.
The dataset contains unmatched detailed information on temporary agency workers, the times and
conditions of their work assignments, as well as the terms of their employment contract with the
agency. The availability of person, agency, and client identi…ers in combination with the longitu-
dinal employment and assignment information give rise to a comprehensive panel data set that,
to our knowledge, for the …rst time covers information on all three actors that are party to the
triangular set-up of the THA submarket and their respective dealings with each other. Covering
the period from September 1999 to March 2003, the THAD is very current and can thus be used
to study actual state of a¤airs in the German THA industry. At the same time, the data set covers
a su¢ciently long period of time so that individual employment histories of THA workers at the
agency and client …rms can be observed. Moreover, with information on more than 200 branches
spread throughout Germany, analyses at the regional level can be performed. Large sample sizes,
in addition, permit disaggregate statistical analyses for individual subgroups of workers. A de-
tailed description of the dataset and the variables recorded therein can be found in Appendix 1.
Summary statistics of the THAD are provided in Table 1 below.
1Additional agreements were reached between the DGB and the Association of German Temporary Work Agencies
(IGZ), as well as between the recently founded Association of Middle Class Temporary Work Agencies (MVZ) and
the Christian Trade Union Organisation (CGG).
5Table 1: Key Statistics of the Data Set
Indicator 1999-2002 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
No. of branches 225 140 184 206 177 166
No. of workers 76119 13750 31868 29508 27720 11177
No. of client …rms 30530 5840 13257 12535 10226 3453
Left-censored empl. spells (in %) 10.7 63.0 17.1 5.5 3.1 4.6
Right-censored empl. spells (in %) 10.4 5.0 4.4 7.4 21.9 70.9
No. of observations Part I 1297480 101453 324287 398098 379938 101220
No. of observations Part II 282342 25509 82580 79987 77820 16441
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
4 The Agency and Labor Allocation
Temporary help agencies hire workers for the purpose of lending their labor services to client …rms.
In the triangular setup of the THA submarket, therefore, agencies act both as an intermediate
demander and as a …nal supplier of labor. Client demand, however, is subject to signi…cant
volatility, as assignments can be terminated on demand by the client …rm. If the agency faces
excess or de…cient supply of workers on sta¤ relative to current realizations in the demand for its
services, it will incur …nancial losses. In the former case, these will take the form of continuing wage
bill obligations, in the latter foregone revenue due to cancellation of an order. Pro…t-maximization
therefore entails careful sta¤ planning on the agency’s part. At any point in time, it must have a
pool of workers at its disposal that is large enough to promptly meet ‡uctuations in client demand,
but that avoids under-utilization of its workforce in times of de…cient demand for its services.
To this end, agencies can take recourse to both external (workforce adjustment) and internal
(e¢cient utilization of existing workforce) instruments of personnel management. Predominant
reliance on either of these adjustment margins, however, implies di¤erent roles for THAs on the
labor market. If agencies largely adjust their own workforce in line with changes in present client
demand, then THAs would in fact assume the role of mere employment agencies. Workers, of
course, remain on the payroll of the agency for the duration of the individual assignment, which
in this case is equivalent to the length of the employment contract. The main raison d’être of
THAs in this setting, would be their ability to exploit economies of scale in the recruitment of
workers. If, in contrast, THAs primarily maintain a pool of longer-term temps and satisfy the
demand of client …rms through repeated assignments of personnel out of their existing workforce,
then THAs can also perform an important pooling function on the labor market. For the …xed
costs of recruitment and employment termination can be spread across di¤erent assignments and
thus clients. As e¤ective transaction costs per match are reduced, overall e¢ciency gains in the
job matching process are feasible. Making use of THA services may therefore also provide some
kind of insurance to client …rms against unforeseen idiosyncratic shocks to their product demand
6that would otherwise entail costly workforce adjustment on their part.
Which of the two adjustment margins is in fact utilized more heavily is still unexplored. Lack
of adequate data on the internal operation of THAs has hitherto prevented such an analysis. The
THAD, however, contains information on both adjustment dimensions and so puts us in a position
to make some headway in our understanding of the allocative function of THAs on the labor
market. We begin our analysis with an examination of the external adjustment margin, i.e. the
creation and destruction of THA jobs.
4.1 Extensive Margin - The THA as an Intermediate Demander of Labor
In this section, we investigate to what extent workers are hired on-call in line with current levels
of client demand, the extent of recalls among all recruits, and the spread and growth of …xed-term
contracts since their one-time use in the industry became permissible in 1997. In addition, we
examine which party to the employment relationship in fact initiates a separation and the means
employed to this end. We begin our analysis, however, with a documentation of the job-speci…c
employment durations and turnover rates of THA workers, which are but inadequately recorded
in the o¢cial industry statistics of the federal employment o¢ce.2
4.1.1 Employment Duration and Labor Turnover
As shown in Table 2, THA employment is subject to exceedingly high turnover.T u r n o v e rr a t e si n
excess of 200% per annum imply that the employment stock is statistically renewed more than
twice a year. This order of magnitude in the THAD is in line with o¢cial statistics of the federal
employment o¢ce for the entire THA industry (see Burda/Kvasnicka, 2003). The corresponding
value for the economy at large is roughly 30%, or just above one-seventh of this value (Franz,
1999). On this count, the THA submarket undoubtedly represents a most dynamic segment on
the German labor market.
2A number of shortcomings characterize the ANUSTAT. Employment tenures are recorded for out‡ows only and
disclosed in but three duration categories (less than one week, one week to three months, more than three months).
In addition, the employment stock …gures provided therein refer exclusively to workers currently in an assignment
and therefore systematically underestimate true employment levels in the industry. Measures of total in‡ows in the
ANUSTAT are downward biased, as well. For new entries to the industry are only recorded if the workers are hired
at their current branch for the …rst time. Finally, the ANUSTAT does not provide disaggregate …gures for di¤erent
types of jobs in its in‡ow and out‡ow statistics.
7Table 2: Employment Dynamics, 2000-2002
Year Annual ...
Average Employment Stock In‡ows Out‡ows Turnover (%)3
2000 9458 25143 23755 259
2001 10213 21374 22577 215
2002 9336 20542 20480 220
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
A more detailed picture is provided in Table 3, which documents the in‡ow share, average
employment duration, and turnover for the 12 most frequently encountered occupations4.T o -
gether these professions account for nearly 92% of the agency total. The two duration measures
are obtained from in‡ow rather than stock data to avoid length biased sampling. The …rst set of
estimates in column 3 is based on employment spells that are actually completed within the obser-
vation period of the THAD. However, as the exclusion of right-censored spells might introduce a
non-negligible downward bias in our duration estimates, we also report observed average durations
for all recorded in‡ows irrespective of their censoring status (column 4). Although only 2.8% of all
employment relationships begun in 2000 are in fact right-censored, their inclusion raises average
tenure across all groups by nearly 14% (from 131 to 149 days). Nevertheless, average job duration
is well below one year on both measures employed and for all job types considered.
Table 3: Employment Dynamics by Job Type, 2000-2003
Jobs Started in 2000 Turnover 2002
Job type In‡ow Share (%) Average Job Duration (days) (%)
Completed Spells All5
locksmiths 1.1 178 213 133
electricians 0.9 209 239 147
metal workers 8.6 118 136 108
help workers 45.6 111 124 298
truck drivers 0.9 140 152 151
warehousemen 4.5 101 113 348
quali…ed data processors 3.5 170 198 109
quali…ed o¢ce workers 13.0 176 202 158
stenographers 0.5 191 207 71
data typists 1.4 131 140 173
o¢ce hands 7.7 145 167 189
telephonists 4.0 142 160 225
Source: THAD 1999-2003.







average employment stock .
4T h ej o bt y p e sa r eb a s e do nat h r e ed i g i tl e v e lj o bc l a s s i … c a t i o ns c h e m e( s e ev a r i a b l eJ O B _ D E S C Ri nT a b l eA 1
in Appendix 1) that employers are required to use in their statutory noti…cations to the institutions of the social
security system in Germany.
5Right-censored employment spells have been assigned the last date observable in the data set as their terminal
time so as to calculate observed job durations in these cases.
8As column 2 shows, the THA’s activity is largely con…ned to a handful of professions.H e l p
workers constitute almost half of all new jobs created in 2000. With low average job duration,
second only to that of warehousemen, this group is largely accountable for the low grand average
across all groups considered.6 Moreover, professions with a low and general skills content, such as
help-workers, telephonists, warehousemen, and o¢ce hands are subject to an above-average rate of
turnover (column 5). Quali…ed data processors and stenographers, who are quite skill-intensive,
exhibit, in contrast, far lower levels of turnover. Both systematic di¤erences in the average number
of placements or in their durations (Section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3), as well as di¤erential quitting behavior
(Section 4.1.3) may be accountable for this heterogeneity. Nevertheless, with the notable exception
of stenographers, all professions considered are subject to considerable turnover. In the next two
subsections, we delve into this matter by looking more closely at the corresponding in‡ows and
out‡ows of workers.
4.1.2 Job Creation
In the previous section, labor turnover was shown to be exceedingly high. As a consequence, at any
point in time new hires constitute a signi…cant proportion of the total stand-by THA workforce
available for client placements. It is still unclear, whether agencies hire workers primarily on-call,
i.e. conditional on having a speci…c placement opportunity lined-up, or rather as regular additions
to their sta¤ from which they subsequently serve client demand if and when required. On-call
recruitment is attractive, because it avoids initial unproductive employment of a worker. Precau-
tionary hirings instead reduce the risk of being in short supply should client demand unexpectedly
pick up. An empirical test that suggests itself in this context is to examine the extent to which
new recruits, once hired, are immediately placed with a client. As can be seen in Table 4, for
the vast majority of new entries (90.6%), the starting dates of THA employment and …rst assign-
ment in fact coincide. In an extension of the two-sided matching model of the labor market by
Mortensen and Pissarides (Pissarides, 1991), Neugart and Storrie (2002), in contrast, have opted
for an unconditional hiring strategy of agencies in their theoretical model of the THA submarket.
This assumption is clearly inconsistent with our …ndings.
6As a result of these comparatively short employment durations, the share of help workers in the employment
stock on a given day (stock sampling) is considerably smaller than the corresponding in‡ow …gure. On the 30.6.2000,
it amounted to 27.3%, a magnitude that is in line with …gures of the ANUSTAT, the o¢cial biannual temporary
agency work statistics of the federal employment o¢ce.
9Table 4: Placement Status of New Recruits, 1999-2003
Placement Status Share (%)
immediate placements 90.6
(entry date = starting date of placement)
delayed placements: ... all 7.6
... · 2d a y sd e l a y 4.5
(entry date < starting date of placement)
no placements 1.8
(during entire employment relationship)
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
To be viable, however, this recruitment strategy necessitates comprehensive screening of workers
well in advance of actual recruitment. For the agency has to be in a position to provide a good
and above all speedy match from its …les of job-seekers once a pro…table placement opportunity
has arisen. In short, if hiring is on-call, screening cannot be. Moreover, as these workers are yet
in no way contractually bound to the agency, this external pool is likely to be in constant ‡ux.
For workers might well continue their job search and …nd alternative employment or simply refuse
in the end to accept a job when o¤ered one by the agency. To compensate for these dropouts,
continuing screening activity on the agency’s part on a scale beyond current actual requirements
is necessary. As a means to reduce its screening expenses, the agency might heavily rely on recalls.
However, as shown in Table 5, recalls occur on but a minor scale within the agency7, a …nding
that is all but surprising given the severe industry-speci…c restrictions imposed on their usage (see
Section 2).
Table 5: Recalls of Workers, 2002
Recalls Share (%) in Total Hirings
... at same branch 9.4
... at di¤erent branch 2.9
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
Another means for the THA to economize on turnover costs represents the conclusion of …xed-
term instead of open-ended employment contracts. Table 6 provides …rst-time evidence on the
spread of …xed-term contracts in the THA industry, since their one-time use became admissible
in 1997 as part of a reform of the AÜG (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz), the law on temporary
7In our calculations, we de…ned as recalls all observed reentries of workers to the TWA, irrespective of the elapsed
time between the two entries.
10agency work in Germany. In the entire observation period of the THAD, 24.7% of all new in‡ows
are hired on a …xed-term contract. On an annual basis, their share among all new jobs created
increases markedly, from 20.9% in 2000 to 33.1% in 2002. Evidence for the …rst quarter of 2003
suggests that this trend is likely to continue for the current year. Nevertheless, workers on a …xed-
term contract still account for only about 7-9% of the workforce on a given day (stock sampling).8
As the next subsection will show, this discrepancy in ‡ow and stock measures is attributable
to signi…cantly shorter tenures for workers hired on a …xed-term rather than on an open-ended
contract. In sum, while …xed-term contracts seem by now to be well established and growing in
importance, their employment share does not markedly di¤er from that encountered on the general
labor market. For younger age cohorts, they are in fact far less common.9 It has to be kept in mind,
however, that a …xed-term employment contract can be concluded but once between an agency
and a worker in the THA industry (see Section 2). On the general labor market, in contrast, three
consecutive …xed-term contracts can be concluded within a maximum period of two years.
Table 6: Spread of Fixed-Term Contracts, 1999-2003
Share (%) of Workers Hired
Recruits on a Fixed-Term Contract in:
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
All recruits: – 20.9 22.0 33.1 –
Those recruited in:
1st quarter – 19.2 16.2 22.7 35.5
2nd quarter – 17.5 20.0 26.6 –
3rd quarter – 26.4 24.1 35.0 –
4th quarter 14.9 19.4 28.0 45.9 –
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
Before we turn to an investigation of how THA workers are actually put to productive use
in assignments, we complete our documentation of THA workforce adjustment with a survey of
employment termination.
4.1.3 Job Destruction
In consideration of the fact that average tenure in temporary agency work falls signi…cantly short of
employment durations generally encountered on the labor market, the THA industry has frequently
been criticized to o¤er but fragile, unstable employment. Short employment durations, however, do
8Workers employed on a …xed-term contract constituted 8.0%, 6.8%, and 8.9% of the employment stock in 2000,
2001, and 2002, respectively.
9According to the Federal Statistical O¢ce, 9% of workers in dependent employment excluding apprentices held
a …xed-term contract in Germany in May 2000. Among those aged thirty or less, 21% were employed on a …xed-term
contract on the sampling date (Federal Statistical O¢ce press release, 2001). The respective …gure for this age group
in the TWAD is signi…cantly smaller, amounting to only 9% in May 2000.
11not of themselves necessarily testify for fragility. A claim to the contrary is based on the implicit,
but untested assumption that average employment tenure in the THA industry is short, primarily
because workers are laid o¤ by their agencies, rather than quitting voluntarily. The THAD allows to
adjudicate upon this matter, for it records which party to the employment contract in fact initiates
the displacement. Table 7 reports the distribution of exit reasons for all completed employment
spells in the entire data set (years 1999-2003). The …rst three rows comprise exits that constitute
voluntary severances from the perspective of the worker.10 With a combined share of 57.1%, they
account for the majority of all observed separations. 40.4% of workers are laid o¤ by the THA (sum
of rows 4 and 5), roughly a third of which is dismissed without notice. Dismissals without notice,
however, have to be justi…ed on the grounds of gross worker misconduct to be legally binding. In
fact, among those workers dismissed without notice in the observation period, a total of 79% are
recorded absent from work prior to being laid o¤ by the agency. Finally, changes of branch account
for a mere 2.4% of separations. Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix 2 contain additional evaluations for
di¤erent regions and groups of workers. While di¤erences do exist among these, the overall pattern
is pretty similar.11 In particular, voluntary severances constitute the majority of observed exits in
all groups considered. These …ndings qualify the notion that short employment spells necessarily
testify for the insecure nature of jobs created on this submarket of the labor market. Exit reasons
are quite diverse and voluntary severances are frequently encountered. The large share of voluntary
quits also implies that a signi…cant fraction of labor turnover is in fact exogenous to the agency, a
drain of workers that needs to be compensated for by new hirings if the THA wants to maintain
its sta¢ng levels.
Table 7: Reasons for Job Termination, 1999-2003
Reasons Share (%) Average Completed
Tenure (Days)
voluntary quits 24.2 234
cancellation agreements 15.4 151
…xed-term contracts12 17.5 44
changes of branch 2.4 253
dismissals 27.9 184
dismissals without notice 12.5 90
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
10Termination of employment caused by the expiration of a …xed-term contract may not be voluntary ex post,
but surely is so ex ante from the perspective of the worker when the contract is signed.
11Voluntary quits and dismissals without notice are more common in the old than in the new German Lander.
The reverse applies to dismissals. While di¤erences across sexes and nationality are in general less marked, they
are quite substantial for di¤erent collars. Voluntary quits and expiration of a …xed-term contract are most common
among white collar workers; dismissals without notice among unskilled blue collar workers, and dismissals among
skilled blue collar workers. Expirations of a …xed-term contract, and dismissals without notice decline with age,
while dismissals increase.
12Only 70.4% of workers employed on a …xed-term contract exit the agency because their contract expires. The
remainder is comprised of voluntary quits (7.3%), dismissals (6.6%), cancellation agreements (10.2%), dismissals
12Average completed tenure varies considerably across termination reasons (3rd column). As may
be expected, it is low for those dismissed without notice (90 days) and high for those that exit
to another branch of the same agency (253 days). For low-productivity workers are more likely
to be dismissed early, while high-productivity workers may be transferred to another branch, if
insu¢cient client demand on site precludes further pro…table employment at the current outlet of
the agency. The low value for workers whose …xed-term employment contract has expired may
be caused by the fact that in these cases the duration of the employment contract has been set
according to the duration of the …rst client placement of the worker (synchronization of employment
and placement). If a follow-up placement opportunity does not arise in time of the conclusion of
this primary placement, the …xed-term employment contract is allowed to expire rather than being
converted into an open-ended employment contract for the worker.
In the previous subsection, we have seen that the THA recruits new personnel on-call, thereby
minimizing the risk of initially unproductive employment of workers. In the present context,
we may analogously investigate the extent to which workers are engaged in client assignments
immediately preceding the termination of their job. The termination of employment, however, is
subject to constraints not encountered at the level of job creation. For temporary work agencies,
just as any other employer, are in general obliged to meet legal notice periods before laying o¤ a
worker. The possibilities to reach cancellation agreements and conduct once-only synchronizations
of the …rst client assignment and employment spell of a worker give agencies an additional degree
of freedom in this context and therefore a means to avoid continued unproductive employment
if a follow-up client order is not forthcoming. As shown in Table 8, only a minority of workers
(39.6%) in fact exits the THA straight from a client assignment. Among those dismissed and those
dismissed without notice, their respective share is especially low. The opposite applies to workers
that leave because their …xed-term contract has expired.
Table 8: Share of Workers Assigned on Exit in 2002




changes of branch 59.5
dismissals 15.6
dismissals without notice 6.9
All exits 39.6
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
without notice (4.8%), and changes of branch (0.7%). As a consequence, if in‡ows instead of out‡ows are considered,
the share of workers employed on such a contract is much larger (see previous subsection).
13However, a closer look is warranted, for not all exits from nonassignment necessarily testify
for an underutilization of workers at the end of their employment relationship. For this purpose,
Table 9 documents the average number of regular workdays spent in nonassignment by exit reason
along with the major causes recorded for those unproductive days.13 Workers that exit the THA
from a state of nonassignment on average remain employed for another 8.7 regular work days after
their last client engagement. Continuation of employment is longest for workers that are dismissed
(11.9 days) and shortest for workers that exit because their …xed-term employment contract has
expired (4.7 days). These durations alone, however, confer yet little information on the agency´s
ability to e¤ectively use its workers right up to and in the immediate forefront of the termination
of employment.
Table 9: Average Days since Last Placement by Exit Reason for all Exits in 2002
Average regular work days since last placement for those nonassigned on exit
Reasons Total of which due to ...
Lack of Paid Balancing Unpaid Paid Sick
Client Demand Vacation Hrs. Account Absenteeism Leave
voluntary quits 6.2 0.3 3.0 0.6 0.4 1.0
cancellation agreements 5.7 0.7 1.6 0.4 0.6 1.2
…xed-term contracts 4.7 0.4 0.9 0.2 1.0 0.9
changes of branch 7.7 1.4 1.5 0.2 0.2 0.9
dismissals 11.9 1.8 2.3 0.7 1.3 3.5
dismissals without notice 6.9 0.3 0.4 0.1 4.3 1.2
All exits 8.7 1.0 1.9 0.5 1.5 2.2
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
For one thing, workers might not in fact be available for placements, so in the case of absenteeism
and sick leave, over which the THA has no control. In addition, remaining holiday entitlements, as
well as days o¤ to balance workers’ hours account may be granted. In contrast to absenteeism and
sick leave, however, the latter two can be deliberately timed to bridge periods when client demand
is not forthcoming and therefore may be actively employed as a means of personnel management
by the THA. In short, it is but lack of client demand that truly evinces an underutilization of
labor. Evidence on the quantitative importance of these causes is provided in columns 2 to 6 in
Table 9. Lack of client demand never tops the list. In fact, it is second-lowest in quantitative
terms among the …ve reasons listed in Table 9. Only for workers that are dismissed or change
branch does lack of client demand account for well over 10% of total time spend unassigned. Paid
vacation and balancing of workers’ hours account, in contrast, together account for nearly 30%
of average regular workdays elapsed since the last client engagement. Noteworthy is the share of
13The …ve reasons listed in Table 9 together account for over 80% of the average total number of days workers
spent in nonassignment prior to leaving the TWA. The remainder is comprised of a multitude of minor causes, such
as child care responsibilities, or paid for special company leave.
14unproductive regular work days attributable to unpaid absenteeism for workers dismissed without
notice (62%), an issue that we have already alluded to. Recapitulating the above, the agency
proves quite e¢cient in utilizing its workers before they drop out. Almost 40% exit straight from
an assignment and among the remainder, lack of client demand accounts for but a minor share of
regular work days lost.
4.2 Intensive Margin - The THA as a Final Supplier of Labor
We now turn to the intensive adjustment margin, i.e. the e¤ective utilization by the THA of its
existing workforce. In Germany, THAs have to pay their workers irrespective of whether they are
on an assignment and thus generate revenue for the agency or not. For both weekly hours and the
gross hourly wage rate are set out in the employment contract and binding thereupon for the entire
duration of the employment relationship. As a consequence, an agency has to e¢ciently use its
workforce through successive assignments, keeping to a minimum periods their labor lies idle if it
wants to cover its wage bill. The ability of THA …rms to perform this task is as yet unexplored. In
the near vicinity of the creation and termination of THA jobs, however, we have already established
that the agency under investigation is indeed quite e¢cient in minimizing times of unproductive
employment. We begin this issue of labor utilization by examining the distribution of agreed weekly
working hours between the agency and the worker, as these constitute the reference quantity of
work that the agency has to pay and consequently has to aim to utilize to the fullest through
successive assignments of the worker.
4.2.1 Agreed Weekly Hours
Table 10 tabulates the distribution of agreed working hours per week.14 As is evident, …ve major
contractual working schedules are operative. The spread among them, however, is very unequal.
In fact, agreed working time hardly varies at all across workers. About 90% of workers have a
stipulated 35 hours week, causing mean contractual hours per week to fall but just below this …gure
(34.7 for men, 34.0 for women). Men tend to have slightly longer weekly schedules than women, but
the di¤erences are not very marked. White-collar workers, in turn, on average have longer working
schedules than blue-collar workers, but again 35 hours are by and large the norm for this group (see
Table A5 in Appendix 3). In addition, over the 5 years sampled, the distribution of contractual
working schedules is remarkably stable (not shown). From the perspective of the employment
contract between agency and worker, therefore, temporary agency work is predominantly full-time,
14The ANUSTAT does not contain information on hours work. The IAB Employment Subsample 1997-1995, the
sole microeconomic dataset in Germany suitable for analyses of the TWA industry, only distinguishes between three
broad and insu¢ciently delimited categories of contracted weekly working hours, two of which represent part-time
employment (< 18 hrs., > 18 hrs. but less than full-time, and full-time).
15albeit at a lower level of contracted weekly working hours than is usually the norm on the labour
market.
Table 10: Agreed Weekly Hours 1999-2003
Agreed weekly Share (%):
hours: All Men Women
20 1.9 1.2 3.2
25 0.9 0.6 1.6
30 1.5 1.0 2.4
35 91.0 92.3 88.6
40 3.5 3.9 2.6
others total 1,3 1.1 1.7
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
It remains to be seen, however, to what extent these contractually agreed and thus to be paid
for weekly working hours are put to productive use in assignments. For a given THA workforce,
three aspects ultimately determine the degree of its e¤ective utilization. First, the number of
di¤erent client engagements per worker. Second, the volume of labor per worker contracted by
individual clients. And …nally, the time workers spend in nonassignment and thus do not generate
any revenue for the agency. We will deal with these in turn, before in a …nal benchmark test
contrasting average actual weekly hours of work with those agreed to contractually.
4.2.2 Client-Worker Matches
Table 11 shows for all employment relationships that are not left-censored in the observation period
of the THAD the distribution of clients per worker and the contribution of workers with multiple
client engagements to the overall volume of client-worker matches formed by the agency. Evidently,
the majority of workers (62.4%) has but one client contact during his employment relationship with
the agency (column 2). Roughly only every …fth worker is placed with two clients, and only every
twelfth with three. From the perspective of workers, therefore, THA employment is dominated by
relatively few, if not singular client engagements.15
For the THA, however, it is the volume of matches that constitutes the relevant benchmark. For
its ability to pool the hiring and …ring costs of a worker depends on the extent it can spread these
…xed transaction costs per head of its own workforce adjustment across di¤erent client assignments.
As column 3 shows, the majority of worker-client matches are indeed comprised of workers with
multiple client assignments (69.0%). Workers with a single client engagement account for only one
third of the total volume of worker-client matches. In the majority of matches, therefore, the agency
15On average, workers have assignments with 2.0 di¤erent clients. As the inclusion of right-censored employment
relationships may have biased the results obtained, we have conducted an additional exploration, where we excluded
these cases. The results, however, hardly change. The share of workers with a single client engagement increases
somewhat to 63.8%, causing the average number of client contacts per worker to drop to 1.9 and the share of workers
with but a single client engagement in all client-worker matches to rise to 33.6%.
16is in a position to pool and spread its …xed costs of recruitment and employment termination across
di¤erent clients. This …nding is important, for it evinces that THAs can improve labor market
e¢ciency by e¤ectively reducing costly frictions that would otherwise accrue in the job matching
process.
Table 11: Number of Di¤erent Clients per Worker, 1999-2003
Number Share Share in total Worker-











> 10 1.2 9.0
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
A related question that we may now address is whether the agency primarily serves client
demand from an external (pre-screened but not yet employed job-seekers) or an internal pool of
workers (existing workforce of the agency). To answer this question, Table 12 considers all worker-
client matches in the observation period of the THAD, irrespective of the censoring status of the
underlying employment relationship. The decisive quantity in this context is the share of worker-
client matches in which the start of the placement and the employment spell of the worker coincide
(on-call recruitment). The remainder is comprised of worker-client matches, where the worker
party to the particular match is either only placed with delay upon entry or has been already
assigned to a client beforehand.
Table 12: External and Internal Pools of Workers





(workers with delayed / prior placements)
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
It turns out that only just above one third of the total volume of worker-client matches involve
workers that are in fact hired on-call. In other words, despite large turnover and the predominance
17of on-call recruitment, in about two-thirds of all worker-client matches the agency serves client
demand by taking recourse to its existing workforce. The internal pool of workers therefore clearly
dominates the external one as the primary source of manpower employed in the supply of THA
services to client …rms.
4.2.3 Volume of Labor Supplied to Client Firms
We now turn to the actual volume of labor supplied by the agency. Unlike in the previous subsec-
tion, the focus is therefore on hours THA workers spent at client …rms, or to be more accurate,
on productive hours, i.e. hours actually invoiced to clients. Table 13 provides summary statistics
on the distributions of total productive hours (1) per worker, (2) per worker-client match, and
(3) per client. On average, THA workers perform about 630 hours in assignments during their
employment at the agency, while a particular client engagement averages nearly 300 hours. The
spread, however, is considerable, as evinced by the very large standard deviations encountered.
The same applies to particular worker-client matches. Among the …nal demanders of labor, the
distribution is even more skewed to the left, an issue that we will shortly explore in greater depth.
Table 13: Summary Statistics on Total Volume of Labor Contracted
Total Hours Contracted:
Unit Mean Percentiles:
25% 50% 75% 99%
per worker 633:7
(896:1)
96.0 297.0 796.0 4636.3
per worker-client 289:9
(479:5)
30.3 98.9 330.6 2068.7
per client 1653:2
(12617:2)
47.0 197.0 827.1 25189.7
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
A more detailed representation of the volume of labor supplied to client …rms in di¤erent
occupations is provided in Table 14. In line with the distribution of employment durations explored
in Table 7, help workers and warehousemen display the lowest average total hours contracted per
worker and per worker-client match among the job types considered (column 2). Quali…ed data
processors, o¢ce workers, and stenographers are in the lead on both measures employed, being
only surpassed on the former dimension by electricians. As shown in the third column, average
assignment durations in service-sector jobs generally exceed those in industrial jobs by an order of
magnitude. Ratios of the two measures vary signi…cantly across professions. On average, workers
have 2.1 di¤erent client engagements, but once again signi…cant di¤erences exist across occupations.
Electricians, for instance, are on average placed with 4.6 clients, whereas telephonists and quali…ed
data processors attain but 1.4, respectively 1.6 di¤erent client engagements.
18Table 14: Total Hours Contracted per Worker Entering THA in 2000
Average




metal workers 594 253
help workers 525 235
truck drivers 682 268
warehousemen 463 215
quali…ed data processors 856 532
quali…ed o¢ce workers 876 433
stenographers 853 393
data typists 619 347
o¢ce hands 731 378
telephonists 644 448
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
Using intensity among client …rms has been shown to be exceedingly dispersed in Table 13. To
investigate this issue further, Table 15 documents the average share of the largest client …rms in
the total volume of hours contracted at branch level. As is evident, the demand for THA services
at the branch level is heavily concentrated among few client …rms. The agency’s customer base,
therefore, appears to be segmented into a large fringe of minor users and a small core of large
customers.
Table 15: Volume of Hours Contracted by Largest Clients
Client …rms by Share (%) in total volume
volume of hours of hours in branches with:
< 100 ... 1 0 0-2 5 0. . . > 250 clients
1% largest users – 25.1 27.4
5% largest users 42.0 59.3 58.9
10% largest users 58.4 73.4 72.3
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
4.2.4 Time Spent in Nonassignment
The third aspect impacting on the degree of e¤ective workforce utilization is the amount of regular
work days THA workers spend on average in nonassignment during their employment at the THA.
As pointed out before, workers may be unassigned for various reasons, not all of which constitute
a direct monetary loss to the agency, nor are they evidence of e¤ective labor underutilization.
Unpaid absenteeism, for instance, neither involves direct wage costs for the THA, nor is it under
19its immediate control. In the case of paid sick leave, wage bill obligations continue to accrue, but
again the THA has no leverage over these absences from work. Just as holidays, these times should
ultimately be disregarded in any benchmark test of e¢cient labor utilization, as manpower in these
cases is not available for disposal by the THA.
Absenteeism, paid-for sick leave and vacation days together account for more than half the
average total of regular work days workers spent unassignment (see Table 16). However, only a
small fraction of total days lost is attributable to a lack of client demand. Consistent with our
…ndings for the external adjustment margin, therefore, the agency also proves itself to be very
e¢cient on the internal margin in minimizing times of unproductive employment of its workforce.




sick without continued pay 8.7
special leave 1.6
sick with 100% continued pay 19.6
paid vacation 29.0
no assignment 8.4
balancing hours account 7.4
others total 1.6
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
4.2.5 Agreed versus Actual Hours
We have seen that the agency succeeds in minimizing times of unproductive employment of work-
ers. However, this does not necessarily imply that the THA in fact uses its workforce to capacity.
Hours of work have so far been neglected in the analysis. A test of e¤ective workforce utilization
entails a comparison of average actual weekly hours of work performed to those agreed contractu-
ally. For the …ve major work schedules identi…ed, Table 17 provides two measures of the former
that di¤er but in the respective reference period chosen in their calculations. The …rst con…nes
itself to periods of assignments only and therefore constitutes a measure of actual weekly hours of
work performed during client assignments. The second measure instead is based on periods work-
ers are in fact available to the THA for placements. As argued before, this restriction excludes
periods of absenteeism, holidays, sick leave and the like and leaves us essentially with time spent in
nonassignment due to either a lack in client demand or balancing of one´s hour account in addition
to periods of worker assignment.
20Table 17: Agreed vs. Actual Weekly Hours, 1999-2003
Weekly hours of work
Agreed Actual during ...
Client Times Workers are







Both during assignments (column 2) and in times of actual worker availability for assignments
(column 3), actual weekly hours of work on average exceed those agreed contractually in all but the
largest category (40 hrs.). Weekly work schedules may be deliberately set at lower levels by the
THA than on average materialize for two reasons. First, an overutilization of labor (overtime) is
less costly to the THA than an underutilization, as overtime rates are generally but a fraction of
an hour’s pay and basic wage payments, unlike in the latter case, continue to be covered by fees
collected. Second, overtime, rather than in pecuniary form, may instead be compensated through
additional time o¤ when client demand is slack (see Table 16) and therefore be employed as a
precautionary bu¤er to cope with volatile client demand.
5 Worker Compensation and Client Fees
Having addressed various aspects of the quantity of THA labor traded, we now turn to its price.
As an intermediate demander and …nal supplier of labor, the agency pays the wages of workers and
in turn receives fees for their labor services from client …rms during assignments. While studies
on the former price are sparse but growing, they are totally lacking for the latter.16 The THAD,
however, records both the hourly wages of workers and the hourly fees charged for their services.
The primary objective of the ensuing analysis, therefore, is to provide a …rst survey of the operative
wage and fee structures. In-depth analyses of their respective determinants, however, are beyond
the scope of this paper and left for future research.17
Except for a handful of …rm-level collective agreements, wages in the industry have not been in
general collectively bargained.18 Client fees, too, are determined individually by the two parties
to the commercial placement contract, i.e. the agency and the client …rm. The THA industry in
16Evidence on worker remuneration in the TWA industry is provided in a number of publications, both for
Germany (e.g. Rudolph/Schröder, 1997; Jahn/Rudolph, 2002; Kvasnicka/Werwatz, 2002; Burda/Kvasnicka, 2003),
and internationally (e.g. Segal/Sullivan, 1997/1998; Cohen/Haberfeld, 1993). Storrie (2002) contains a summary of
the available evidence for European countries.
17In an ongoing project, the author is estimating the impact of local labor market conditions and competition
within the industry on the distributions of wages and fees.
18As discussed in Section 2, however, industry-wide collective agreements will take e¤ect in 2004 setting both pay
and general working conditions of temporary agency workers in Germany.
21Germany is still very fragmented by international standards (see CIETT, 2002), not least because
barriers to entry are low. Price-competition, as a consequence, is quite intense.
Clients are charged on an hourly basis and only for labor services e¤ectively used. As such,
neither do …xed outlays for the screening and recruitment of workers accrue directly, nor are clients
liable to charges when the worker is absent form work, on holiday, or falls ill during an assignment.
From the perspective of client …rms, therefore, labor supplied by THA workers ceases to be a quasi-
…xed factor of production. Client …rms gain numerical ‡exibility, otherwise subject to institutional
and legal constraints circumscribing managerial prerogative in sta¢ng matters. It is for this reason
that THAs are more than just labor market intermediaries matching supply to demand. On the
demand side, they e¤ectively create a spot-market for labor. Client fees, therefore, do not only
compensate THAs for actual labor services supplied. They also in part contain a shadow price for
the enhanced ‡exibility a¤orded to client …rms, as the THA assumes sole employer responsibilities.
5.1 Average Wages, Fees, and Markups for Di¤erent Job Types
Table 18 tabulates average job-speci…c hourly wage and fee rates in 2002 for our 12 occupations
considered previously. Average wages per hour range from six euros for help workers to just over
eleven euros for quali…ed data processors. Client fees for these two occupations amount to about
…fteen and thirty euros, respectively. As is evident, except for electricians, wages in service-sector
occupations generally exceed those paid in industrial jobs. While such a clear pattern does not
emerge for client fees, the lowest values are found once again in industrial jobs (help workers,
truck drivers, and warehousemen). The average gross di¤erence between the two price margins
across jobs types amounts to 144%. It is lowest for truck drivers and largest for metal workers.
Interestingly, wages, i.e. the opportunity cost of labor to the agency, are less dispersed across jobs
than client fees.
However, this di¤erence should not be mistaken as pure pro…ts. In addition to non-wage
labor costs, screening expenses, paid for sick leave and continuing wage bill obligations in times
of de…cient client demand, the agency also has to pay taxes, cover its overheads such as the
salaries of its back-o¢ce sta¤, and all costs arising from operating a wide network of branches
spread throughout the country. Client fees also compensate the agency for its high labor turnover.
Information on these individual items are not recorded in the THAD, and would in any case be
di¢cult if not impossible to quantify on a per head basis.
22Table 18: Contractually Agreed Hourly Wages and Fees by Job Type, 2002
Average hourly:
Job type ( 1 )W a g e( E u r ) ( 2 )C l i e n tF e e( E u r ) Gross Mark-Up (%)
locksmiths 7.60 18.42 145.44
electricians 8.66 22.86 160.31
metal workers 6.76 18.63 167.76
help workers 6.16 14.63 139.25
truck drivers 6.63 15.31 131.52
warehousemen 6.28 14.69 135.04
quali…ed data processors 11.09 29.04 159.86
quali…ed o¢ce workers 8.16 20.79 157.29
stenographers 8.94 21.38 140.52
data typists 7.32 19.04 166.82
o¢ce hands 7.46 18.29 148.33
telephonists 6.81 17.65 157.89
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
5.2 Determinants of the Markup in the First Client Assignment
A more promising exercise, and one that adds to our previous discussion, is to investigate the extent
and the manner in which these price margins, in addition to adjustments on the quantitative margin
(workers, hours), are employed by the agency to coordinate and harmonize its demand for and its
supply of labor. Wages unlike fees, however, can not be varied across di¤erent client assignments,
for pay rates, once stipulated, are binding for the duration of the employment contract. In the
majority of cases, workers are hired on-call and have but a singular client engagement. Both wages
and fee rates in the …rst assignment are therefore likely to be simultaneously determined, the former
irreversibly so. As the THA has to recoup its …xed costs per worker from hourly client charges
only, we would expect the markup of fees over wages to depend both on the size of these …xed-costs
and the volume of hours contracted during this …rst assignment. The THAD contains no info on
the …xed costs of recruitment and employment termination incurred by the THA. However, we
may conjecture the former to be lower for workers that have previously been employed at the
THA (recalls). Likewise, costs associated with employment termination should, if anything, be
smaller for workers employed on a …xed-term contract. In both cases, therefore, we would expect
the markup to be of smaller magnitude, anything else equal. One may also hypothesize that the
hourly markup should decrease in the volume of hours contracted during the …rst assignment,
i.e. the period over which the THA can amortize its sunk costs with relative certainty, for …xed
employment costs may be spread across a larger number of hours. Although intuitively appealing,
other forces may work in the opposite direction. The THA may only conduct primary placements
of short duration, if it has already a follow-up placement opportunity lined up for the respective
worker. If indeed the case, …xed-costs per worker need not be recouped entirely during the …rst
23assignment, which would weaken the case for a postulated negative correlation between the markup
and hours contracted in the …rst instance. In addition, match quality might be more important
for longer assignments. As increased screening expenses accrue in this case, …xed-costs per worker
incurred by the THA may rise in the duration of the primary client placement. The required
markup, therefore, may hardly change or even increase in the volume of hours contracted. Finally,
costs associated with the termination of employment are likely to increase in employment tenure,
as, for instance, longer notice periods have to be observed by the THA before laying o¤ a worker.
Again, this would lead one to expect a positive correlation between the markup and the volume of
hours contracted during the …rst assignment. In sum, it is di¢cult to predict the likely net e¤ect
of these countervailing forces.
To assess the validity of our three conjectures, we run a simple OLS regression of the log of
the recorded markup in the …rst client assignment of workers entering the THA in 2001 on the
volume of hours contracted in that spell, a dummy variable for recall status, and a dummy variable
indicating whether the worker is employed on a …xed-term contract. In addition to our variables
of interest, we control for seasonal, regional and job-speci…c e¤ects besides standard socioeconomic
characteristics of workers (age, nationality, sex, educational attainment) by including a series of
indicators that capture di¤erences in levels across di¤erent quarters of the year, branches, and
job types. We con…ne the analysis to full-time workers, i.e. those with contractual weekly hours
of 35 hours or more. Table 19 contains the main body of the regression output. Whereas the
markup modestly increases at a diminishing rate in the volume of hours contracted during the
…rst assignment, it is signi…cantly reduced in the case of workers recalled or hired on a …xed-term
employment contract.






Source: THAD 1999-2003. ¤(¤¤,¤¤¤) indicates statistical signi…cance at
the 10%, (5%, 1%) level. Coe¢cients are rounded to the …fth decimal point.
Although highly statistically signi…cant, the positive impact of hours contracted on the size of
the markup is modest. Evaluated at the mean level of time spent at the …rst client, an additional one
hundred hours increases the markup by less than half a percentage point. Recall and employment
24contract status, on the other hand, have a strong negative e¤ect on the level of the markup.
In the former case, the markup is lowered by 9.6%, in the latter by 6.1%.19 Our latter two
conjectures, therefore, are …rmly corroborated by the data. Disentangling the …xed regional e¤ects
into its constituent parts might provide additional insights into the determination of wages and
fees. Competitive pressures in the industry, as well as labor market conditions may vary across
regions. An assessment of their in‡uence, however, is beyond the scope of this paper and left for
future research.
5.3 Fee Adjustment in Follow-Up Assignments
Another important aspect to be investigated is the extent to which the THA adjusts its client fees
across consecutive placements of workers, given that wages are bounded from below by the terms
set out in the employment contract. Clients may, for instance, terminate an assignment ahead of
time. As workers cannot be laid o¤ immediately, i.e. as quantitative adjustment is not feasible,
and wage bill obligations continue to accrue for the duration of the employment relationship, the
THA may decide to lower its fees so as to stimulate demand for its services. Fixed costs may
already have been recouped in part and follow-up placements, even at a lower stream of revenue
generated, may be a means to avoid or minimize losses otherwise incurred. If indeed the case, we
would expect fees invoiced for workers on their second assignment to be on average lower than
those charged in their …rst client placement.
To explore the validity of this conjecture, we con…ne the sample to the …rst two client placements
of full-time workers with multiple client engagements and run a regression of log hourly fees on a
dummy for second client assignment of workers. Just as before, we control for annual, seasonal,
regional and job-speci…c e¤ects besides standard socioeconomic characteristics of workers. As
hypothesized, we …nd fees to be on average lower in the second client engagement.
Table 20: Hourly Fees in 1st and 2nd Assignment for Entries in 2001
Estimated Coe¢cient
Second client placement -.02866¤¤¤
Source: THAD 1999-2003. ¤¤¤ indicates statistical signi…cance at 1% level.
Coe¢cients are rounded to the …fth decimal point.
19Calculated as: 100 ¤ [exp(est: coefficient) ¡ 1]
256C o n c l u s i o n
Temporary work agencies sell labor services at short notice. The ability of agencies to satisfy
demand for its services both swiftly and tailor-made to the needs of client …rms requires access to a
su¢ciently large standby pool of labor. As we have seen, the agency under investigation successfully
pursues a number of complementary cost-saving strategies in this respect. Hirings occur primarily
on-call in accordance with current client demand to avoid the risk of initial prolonged unproductive
employment of workers, a recruitment strategy that necessitates the screening of job-seekers well
ahead of actual recruitment to be viable. Despite this predominance of on-call recruitment, in
about two-thirds of all worker-client matches the agency serves client demand by resorting to its
existing workforce. One-o¤ recruitment and dismissal costs per worker can thus e¤ectively be
spread across di¤erent clients. Recalls, in turn, are but infrequently employed by the THA as a
means to economize on its screening costs, for their use is severely restricted by a statutory three-
month recall ban. Fixed-term contracts, on the other hand, have experienced rapid growth since
their singular use became admissible in 1997, providing for additional ‡exibility in the termination
of employment. So do cancellation agreements in almost one out of six severances. Consistent with
our conjectures, the markup of fees over wages has been shown to be lower both for recalls and
workers employed on a …xed-term contract.
The agency also proves itself to be very e¢cient in utilizing its existent workforce. Only a
small fraction of total days lost is attributable to a lack of client demand, both in the course
of employment and in the immediate forefront of job termination. Actual weekly hours worked
(at a client) on average even exceed those agreed to contractually. The latter, we have argued,
may in fact deliberately be set below levels than are likely to materialize, as a shortfall of actual
hours from those agreed to is more costly to the THA than an exceedance. Volatile client demand
may induce actual hours performed to ‡uctuate widely around their mean level. Were contractual
hours tailored to this mean, the agency would run the risk of frequent spells of unproductive but
paid for employment. For wage bill obligations stipulated in the employment contract continue to
accrue even if workers are on short hours or not assigned at all. In scaling down contractual hours,
the agency e¤ectively reduces this risk at the price of increased overtime. Overtime premiums
constitute the only additional cost incurred by the THA in this trade-o¤, as basic pay rates are
covered by fees collected. As these premiums are generally but a fraction of an hour’s pay, positive
deviations from agreed weekly working schedules are less costly on the margin than negative ones.
In addition, overtime may be compensated through time o¤ in periods placement opportunities
are not forthcoming. The THA´s ability to adapt and time its own demand for workers to the
demand of client …rms for its services may also be improved by establishing close customers ties.
26Consistent with this conjecture, we …nd client demand to be very concentrated at the branch level.
The preceding analysis has shown that THAs potentially perform a number of complementary
functions on the labor market. Just like recruitment agencies, they are involved in the process
of matching supply and demand. But THAs are more than that. From the perspective of client
…rms, they e¤ectively create a spot market for labor by transforming it from a quasi-…xed factor
of production into a variable one. Moreover, as …xed costs incurred in the recruitment of workers
and termination of their employment may be spread across di¤erent client …rms, overall e¢ciency
gains are attainable.
Major legal changes in the regulatory framework governing the operation of temporary agency
work in Germany are to take e¤ect in less than a year’s time. In addition, wages on this submarket
will henceforth be determined by collective bargaining. Any assessment of the likely e¤ects of this
regime change are speculative. Nevertheless, based on the results obtained, a number of tentative
predictions may be made. The analysis has revealed that …xed-term contracts have experienced
rapid growth since their singular use became admissible in 1997. Allowance of their repeated usage
from 2004 is thus likely to accelerate their spread in the industry. Labor turnover, in all likelihood,
will increase in turn. For average job tenures, as shown, are exceedingly short for workers employed
on a …xed-term contract. The legislated concomitant suspension of the synchronization and recall
bans corroborate this conjecture.
Having addressed a wide range of questions, we left many unanswered. The two price margins
have been investigated only cursorily, as fully-‡edged econometric analyses would have gone beyond
the scope of this paper. A follow-up study will pursue this topic in greater depth, focusing in
particular on the impact of regional labor market conditions and competitive pressures within the
industry on the determination of prices. Among the three actors involved in the triangular setup
of this submarket, we have been most salient on client …rms, for background information on them,
such as industrial a¢liation, or establishment size, are not recorded in the THAD. Nevertheless,
for the …rst time, we have produced statistics on the pattern of utilization of THA services at
the branch level, on the average volume of hours contracted in di¤erent occupations, and on the
respective client fees accruing. The stepping-stone function of temporary agency work has been
neglected entirely in this exploration. For the THAD, until now, does not contain any information
on whether workers …nd subsequent employment at a former client …rm. We hope to include that
information in later editions of the THAD, so as to be in a position to investigate this important,
yet still little researched area.
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29Appendix 1: The Dataset
The data has been generated from information collected at the payroll and the accounting o¢ce
of the company’s headquarters, subsequently stored in two separate corresponding data …les …les
(Part I and Part II) for each branch.
Part I: The Employment Relationship (Agency-Worker)
Part I contains information on the THA worker, the terms of her employment contract with the
agency, and the characteristics of periods of assignments and nonassignments. Table A1 provides
a list and a brief description of key variables contained in Part I.
Table A1: Description of Variables in Part I of the Dataset
Variable Description
Observational Identi…ers (5):
PERSNR = person identi…er
PLACEMENT = assignment indicator
BEGIN = begin date observation begins
END = end date
BRANCH = branch identi…er
Assignment Characteristics (4):
TOTAL_HOURS = total productive hours at client
TOTAL_DAYS = total regular work days per observation
TOTAL_EX_HRS = total hours involving additional compensation
TOTAL_SHIFTHRS = total shift hours performed at client
Nonassignment Characteristics (1):
CAUSE_NONP = cause for nonplacement
Employment Relationship (9):
ENTRY = entry date of worker at branch
EXIT = exit date of worker from branch
EXIT_REASON = reason for job termination
FIXED_TERM = indicator for …xed-term contract
HRS_AGREED_WEEKLY = contractual working hours per week
WAGE = contractual gross hourly wage
INC_EXTRA_TOTAL = total extra income of worker during obs.
JOB_DESCR = job type at agency (3-digit job code)
OCC_STATUS = occupational status at agency (blue, white, etc.)
Worker Characteristics (5):
SECOND_JOB = indicator for second job outside agency
BIRTH_YEAR = birth year of worker
FEMALE = indicator for sex of worker
NATION = nationality of worker
EDUC = educational/vocational attainment of worker
In Part I of the data set, an observation marks a period of regular work days during which
a particular worker is either continuously in assignments (though not necessarily with the same
30client), or continuously not assigned to any client. In particular, the …ve variables de…ning an
observation (PERSNR, PLACEMENT, BEGIN, END, and BRANCH), do not identify a particular
assignment with a single client only. Although such a setup is preferable form an analytical
perspective, it was unable to be realized due to constraints imposed by the data generating process.
A change in the value of any variable recorded leads to a new observation. As an exception to the
aforementioned general setup of Part I of the data set, this convention therefore allows to keep
detailed track of any alternations in the conditions surrounding the employment or assignment of
a particular worker.
Part II: The Commercial Relationship (Agency-Client)
Part II exclusively contains information on the commercial dealings between the agency and
individual client …rms, such as the total amount (in hours) of labor services contracted, or the
total revenue generated for the agency by assigning a particular worker to a speci…c client. Key
variables contained in Part II of the data set are listed along with a brief description in Table A2
below.
Table A2: Description of Variables in Part II of the Dataset
Variable Description
Observational Identi…ers (5):
PERSNR = person identi…er
BEGIN = date current observation begins
END = date current observation ends
CLIENTNR = client …rm identi…er
BRANCH = branch identi…er
Assignment Characteristics (6):
HOURS_TOTAL = total productive (invoiced) hours
HOURS_EXTRA = total extra (invoiced) hours
REVENUE_TOTAL = total revenue received by THA
REVENUE_EXTRA = total extra revenue received by THA
FEE_HOURLY = hourly fee for client for regular hours
WORKTYPE = type of work performed at client
In Part II of the data set, an observation marks one or more consecutive calendar weeks in
which a particular worker has at least one assignment with the same client in every week of that
observation. In other words, the calendar year is split into weeks, and for each consecutive sequence
of weeks in which a worker has been on an assignment with a particular client, there will be a
new corresponding observation entering the data. An observation is therefore assignment-speci…c
( w o r k e r ,c l i e n t… r m )a n dd e … n e db yt h ev a r i a b l e s( P E R S N R ,B E G I N ,E N D ,C L I E N T N R ,a n d
BRANCH) in Part II of the data set. Weeks in which no assignments occur are not explicitly
31recorded, but can be implicitly derived as the time intervals between the individual observations
for a particular worker. If a worker has multiple assignments with di¤erent clients in the same
week, then these will enter Part II as separate observations. This weekly structure of Part II,
just as the daily structure of Part I described before, has been determined by the data generating
process. Clients are billed on a weekly basis, where the invoice and thus the available information
for our data only records the amount of labor transacted (in hours) and the associated revenue
generated during the particular week, but not when, i.e. on what days of the week, these THA
services were in fact delivered.
32Appendix 2: Job Termination
Table A3: Reasons for Leaving THA by Region, Sex, and Nationality, 1999-2003
Share (%)
Reasons Region: Sex: Nationality:
West East Male Female German Foreign
voluntary quits 25.6 17.5 21.8 28.6 24.4 23.4
cancellation agreements 16.0 12.8 15.7 15.0 15.0 17.2
…xed-term contracts 16.2 23.6 15.1 21.8 16.6 21.3
changes of branch 2.6 1.1 2.6 2.0 2.5 1.8
dismissals 25.6 38.9 28.8 26.4 28.9 23.8
dismissals without notice 13.9 6.0 16.0 6.1 12.5 12.4
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
Table A4: Reasons for leaving THA by Collar and Age, 1999-2003
Share (%)
Reasons Occupational Classi…cation: Age on Entry:
Unskilled Blue ... Skilled Blue ... White Collar < 31 31-40 > 40
voluntary quits 19.0 27.6 35.0 23.2 28.0 22.8
cancellation agreements 16.2 16.3 13.9 15.7 14.9 15.2
…xed-term contracts 17.3 7.9 18.3 20.3 12.3 13.7
changes of branch 1.5 2.1 4.4 1.8 3.4 3.0
dismissals 29.0 37.2 24.5 24.1 31.3 37.8
dismissals without notice 16.9 8.7 4.0 14.7 10.1 7.3
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
33Appendix 3: Contractual Weekly Hours
Table A5: Agreed Weekly Hours, 1999-2003
Agreed Weekly Share (%)
Hours: Men Women
Blue Collar White Collar Blue Collar White Collar
20 0.8 2.3 1.9 4.1
25 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.6
30 0.8 1.9 2.3 2.6
35 95.9 79.7 91.2 87.9
40 1.7 14.4 2.3 2.6
others total 0.5 0.9 1.0 1.2
Source: THAD 1999-2003.
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